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According to some current theories, the focus of attention (FOA), part of working memory,
represents items in a privileged state that is more accessible than items stored in other
memory systems. One line of evidence supporting the distinction between the FOA and
other memory systems is the finding that items in the FOA are immune to proactive
interference (when something learned earlier impairs the ability to remember something
learned more recently). The FOA, then, is held to be unique: it is the only memory
system that is not susceptible to proactive interference. We review the literature used
to support this claim, and although there are many studies in which proactive interference
was not observed, we found more studies in which it was observed. We conclude that
the FOA is not immune to proactive interference: items in the FOA are susceptible to
proactive interference just like items in every other memory system. And, just as in all
other memory systems, it is how the items are represented and processed that plays a
critical role in determining whether proactive interference will be observed.
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When short-term memory was created in late 1950s/early 1960s,
it ushered in a view in which memory is divided into mul-
tiple memory systems, each of which has different properties,
each of which operates according to different rules and prin-
ciples, and each of which is responsible for storing different
types of information and supporting memory in different types
of situations. This quickly became the dominant view of the
field. An alternate view emphasizes processing rather systems,
and suggests that memory performance is dependent on the
relation between the processing done at encoding and the pro-
cessing done at retrieval rather than on which store holds the
information. The debate over systems vs. processes was perhaps
most prominent at the turn of the century (see, for example,
the volume edited by Foster and Jelicic, 1999) but it is fair to
say that the debate is still ongoing (see Surprenant and Neath,
2009).
One commonality between these two approaches is that they
emphasize differences (either in store or in processing): Differ-
ences in memory performance are taken as indicating a differ-
ent underlying memory system or different process. Memory,
whether seen as a system or process, is chopped up, divided,
subdivided, and partitioned into ever decreasing portions.
An alternate view emphasizes similarities rather than differ-
ences by advocating the search for general principles of memory
(Surprenant and Neath, 2009). In contrast to both the systems
and processes view, this functional approach focuses on larger and
larger portions of the memory puzzle. It is this view that provided
the impetus for the current paper, and while our question is
narrow, its implications are broad and the answer relevant to
theorists of any persuasion: Is the focus of attention (FOA),
unlike all other proposed memory systems, immune to proactive
interference?
PROACTIVE INTERFERENCE (PI)
Proactive interference (PI) is the finding that old information can
interfere with the ability to remember new information (for a
review, see Neath and Surprenant, in press). It is observed in all
memory systems, including the perceptual representation system,
procedural memory, semantic memory, long-term episodic mem-
ory, and short-term or working memory. Perhaps the most well-
known example was reported by Underwood (1957). He pointed
out that in most memory experiments, subjects receive multiple
lists, and the researcher plots performance averaged over all of
the trials. In contrast, he re-plotted the data as a function of the
number of previous lists and found that the more prior lists,
the worse the level of recall. He and others (for a review, see
Crowder, 1976) suggested that PI was a major source of forgetting
in memory.
According to criteria proposed by Surprenant and Neath
(2009), PI is a candidate for a principle of memory. First, it is
an empirical regularity, being observable in all memory systems;
the only system that is claimed to be immune from PI is the
FOA. Second, it can serve as an intermediate explanation or as
a more abstract statement about a set of results. The results
from a variety of studies can be explained by appealing to PI as
the reason for worse performance in one condition compared
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to an appropriate control, and this can link otherwise disparate
findings. Third, it offers useful information about how memory
works. One example relevant to many people is remembering
the password for a new account rather than a password for a
previously created account.
Being an “intermediate explanation” is not sufficient, however.
PI itself still needs to be explained. Most theoretical accounts
of PI are similar to the basic description: earlier items interfere
with memory for later items (e.g., Henson, 1998; Mensink and
Raaijmakers, 1988). The differences between the various accounts
have to do mostly with the specific nature of the effect of the
prior item. For example, Watkins and Watkins (1975) proposed
an explanation based on cue overload, the finding that the more
items a cue subsumes, the less effective the cue will be. According
to this account, the category (or other salient feature) of the to-
be-remembered items can be a significant retrieval cue. It is as
if the subject were asking at test, “What were the three letters I
just saw?” As more trials occur, the number of potential responses
increases. The cue, in this case, letters, becomes less and less
helpful, as there are more and more letters to choose from. If
the type of category changes, a new cue is used that subsumes
far fewer items and thus performance improves. A different type
of account was offered by Baddeley (1976), who framed PI in
terms of distinctiveness. The idea is easy to appreciate through
an analogy with visual perception: If you are looking at a set
of evenly spaced telephone poles, the closer poles are easy to
distinguish from one another, but as the poles get further away
from the viewer, the poles start to blend together. PI occurs when
the “poles” appear close together and PI can be minimized or
eliminated if the experiment is altered such that the “poles” are
spaced further apart. This idea has been developed and expanded
by Brown et al. (2007). Note that in both cases, a critically
important component is how the to-be-remembered items are
represented.
One reason there is not a universal theoretical account of PI
may be because it is multiply determined. For example, consider
the difference between a recall study and a recognition study. In
the former, the subject receives a short list of items that are all of
the same type (for example, numbers), and is then asked to recall
them. This repeats for a number of lists, and the typical result is
that recall decreases over trials, indicating the build up of PI. At
some point, the type of item changes (for example, to consonants)
and performance on the first changed trial improves, indicating
the release from PI. Now, consider a recognition task. Again, a
short list of items that are all of the same type is presented. Instead
of recalling the items, though, the subject is presented with a
probe item and is asked to judge if the probe was on the list.
The probe could be on the list; it could be a new, never-before
seen item; or it could be an item from a previous list. As reviewed
in more detail below, probes that were in previous lists typically
result in slower response times compared to novel probes. This is
also a from of PI—an earlier item is interfering with memory for a
later item—but this may have a different fundamental cause than
the PI observed in the recall case. For example, the former may
be due to cue overload whereas the latter may be due to a conflict
between two processes, one based on familiarity and one based
on recollection. It is possible that these are different effects, in the
sense of different fundamental causes. However, our claim is not
that there is only one kind of PI, but rather, effects of PI can be
observed in all memory systems, including the Focus of Attention
(FOA).
THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION
A number of researchers have proposed that some types of mem-
ory, all of which resemble William James’ primary memory, are
immune to PI (e.g., Wickens et al., 1981; Halford et al., 1988;
Schweickert, 1993), with the most recent example being Cowan’s
(1999) embedded processes model. This model distinguishes
between (1) long-term memory; (2) working memory, which is
considered to be the activated portion of long-term memory;
and (3) the FOA. The model conceives of working memory as
a set of processes carried out in long-term memory, and that
working memory is simply the subset of information in long-term
memory that is temporarily activated. This is in direct contrast to
other conceptions of working memory, such as Baddeley’s (2003)
version, in which working memory is seen as fundamentally
separate from long-term memory.
The FOA is immune to PI because of the nature of the repre-
sentational state. Items stored in the FOA “are, in a sense, already
retrieved; they reside in a limited-capacity store, eliminating the
retrieval step in which PI arises” (Cowan, 2001, p. 103). This
same idea is invoked in other accounts, even if the term FOA is
not used. For example, Schweickert (1993) posits “direct readout”
and Wickens et al. (1981) explicitly invoke the Jamesian notion
that some items were never “cut off in consciousness”. All these
conceptions, whether termed FOA or not, posit a limited capacity
of approximately four items (e.g., Wickens et al., 1981; Halford
et al., 1988; Cowan, 2001). One reason for this limit is that,
as documented below, these researchers point to a number of
studies in which PI is readily observed with lists with more than
four items but is not observed when the lists had four items or
fewer.
Other researchers have proposed that the FOA has a capac-
ity of only a single item (e.g., Garavan, 1998; McElree, 2001).
One possible reason for the differing estimates may be the use
of different paradigms, but a review of these differing capacity
estimation procedures is beyond the scope of the current paper.1
Nonetheless, we do note that there are studies that demonstrate
PI when only a single item is thought to be held in the FOA (e.g.,
Ruusuvirta et al., 2008).
Instead, we focus our attention on the most common
paradigm used to support the claim of immunity to PI, a variation
of the Sternberg (1966) memory scanning task. In addition, we
include only those studies in which only four or fewer items are
required to be stored in the FOA.
Our approach is based on the following. Currently, many
theorists propose that the FOA is immune to PI. A similar claim
used to be made about implicit memory. In particular, Graf
and Schacter (1987) compared implicit (incidental learning and
indirect test) and explicit (intentional learning and direct test)
memory for word pairs. They found PI for the explicit task but no
1Cowan (2011) argues that the two competing capacity claims are reconcilable;
the interested reader is referred to that article for further details.
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evidence of PI for the implicit task. A subsequent study by Lustig
and Hasher (2001), however, used a slightly modified procedure
and did observe PI. The key difference is that in Lustig and
Hasher’s (2001) design, the interfering information was relevant
at the time of test given the processing that the subjects are asked
to do; in the Graf and Schacter (1987) study, the interfering item
was not relevant. (The experimental details are described at length
in Neath and Surprenant, 2003, pp. 147–150). Our hypothesis is
that it is possible the same situation that existed in the implicit
memory literature exists in the FOA literature. That is, in the
studies that show immunity to PI, the interfering item is not
relevant to the task, and therefore does not cause interference.
According to this explanation, in studies where the interfering
item is relevant, there should be interference.
EVIDENCE SUGGESTING IMMUNITY TO PROACTIVE
INTERFERENCE (PI)
Halford et al. (1988) used a modified Sternberg (1966) memory
scanning task. In Experiment 1, lists of 4 or 10 words were
presented simultaneously on a computer screen. One second after
the list disappeared, a probe appeared. Subjects were asked to
indicate if they had seen the probe item within the memory set
by pressing the “yes” or “no” buttons. PI was manipulated by
presenting words from the same taxonomic category on three
consecutive trials and words from another category for the next
three consecutive trials, and so on. The first trial of a category was
considered to be a low PI trial because the three previous trials had
stimuli from a different category. The third trial of a category was
considered to be a high PI trial because it had words from the same
category as the two preceding trials. When 10 items were shown,
response times were faster and performance was more accurate on
the low PI trials than on high PI trials. Having prior lists with the
same category interfered with performance on later trials, a classic
example of PI. However, there was no difference between the low
PI and high PI trials when only four items were shown. According
to the embedded processes model, when items are in the FOA,
PI is not observed. Because four unrelated items can be stored
within the FOA, the PI manipulation does not have an effect and
performance does not differ between the low and high PI trials.
In contrast, 10 items greatly exceeds the capacity of the FOA, so
other memory systems are recruited; it is these other systems that
produce PI.
Experiment 2 replicated these results, with a few changes.
Halford et al. (1988) employed lists of 4, 6, 8, or 10 words in
the memory set, and in addition, rhyming categories were used
instead of semantic categories. Once again, PI was observed when
the lists had six or more items, but not when the list had only four
items.
Our review of the literature found a number of studies that
replicate this result using the same basic paradigm: Presence of
PI when the memory set contains more than four items and an
absence of PI when the number of to-be-remembered items is 4
or fewer (Wickens et al., 1981, 1985; Cowan et al., 2005; Cowan
and Saults, 2013). All of these studies used a procedure similar to
that used by Halford et al. (1988), in that taxonomic category was
manipulated to induce PI. Thus, there is considerable evidence
supporting the view that the FOA is immune to PI.
EVIDENCE SUGGESTING SUSCEPTIBILITY TO PROACTIVE
INTERFERENCE (PI)
Finding immunity to PI when the to-be-remembered items are
thought to be stored in the FOA is informative only to the extent
that there exist no studies that do observe PI. We reviewed the
literature and found more studies that did observe PI than studies
that did not observe PI (see Table 1). Again, we limit the review
to those studies using a Sternberg memory scanning task with
four or fewer items, although there are many studies in other
paradigms with similar results. We briefly review these studies to
give a suggestion of why the authors of these studies observed
PI whereas those noted above did not. We then discuss possible
causes for the difference in the results.
Hanley and Scheirer (1975) used a modified Sternberg task but
rather than words used letter pairs as the stimuli. On each trial,
subjects saw a total of three items presented sequentially followed
by a probe item. For four trials in a row, the subjects saw letter
pairs, and on the fifth trial the stimuli was switched to two-digit
numbers. After four consecutive trials with numbers, they were
switched back to letters. Thus, Trial 1 was a low PI trial and Trial 4
was a high PI trial. Response times were faster on Trial 1 than
Trial 4, suggesting that PI built up over trials. This was true for
both positive probes (the probe item was in the memory set) and
negative probes (the probe item was not in the memory set).
Carroll et al. (2010) reported what is essentially a replication
of Hanley and Scheirer (1975). The main changes were including
nonwords instead of letter pairs in Experiment 1 and symbols
(such as !@#$&) instead of letter pairs in Experiment 2. The
rationale was that the three letter pairs might be represented as
six items in the FOA, thus exceeding its capacity. Three one-
syllable pronounceable nonwords (e.g., dess, mout, swip) would
not exceed the capacity. In both experiments, response time
increased from Trial 1 to Trial 4, suggesting that items from
the earlier trials interfered with memory on the later trials. In
addition, release from PI was observed in that response times
decreased with a change of materials. This was the case for both
positive and negative probes.
Atkinson et al. (1974) showed subjects 2, 3, 4, or 5 words,
followed by a probe. The probe could be one of the items in the
list (a P or positive trial), or it could be a word that was not on the
list (an N or negative trial). Atkinson et al. (1974) manipulated the
number of times the probe word had been experienced. N1 meant
Table 1 | Studies using a modified Sternberg task that found items in
the FOA are (1) immune to PI (left column) or (2) susceptible to PI
(right column).
FOA is Immune to PI FOA is Susceptible to PI
Cowan and Saults (2013) Atkins et al. (2011)
Cowan et al. (2005) Atkinson et al. (1974)
Halford et al. (1988) Brannelly et al. (1989)
Humphreys and Tehan (1992) Carroll et al. (2010)
Sanders and Willemsen (1978) Craig et al. (2013)
Wickens et al. (1981, 1985) Hanley and Scheirer (1975)
Jonides et al. (1998, 2000)
McElree and Dosher (1989)
Monsell (1978)
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that the word was being seen for the first time. N2 meant that the
word was being seen for the second time, having also been seen as
a distractor on the immediately preceding trial. N3 meant that the
word was being seen for the third time, having been seen on the
preceding list as both a member of the list and as the probe. Mean
RT systematically increased for correct responses on N1, N2, and
N3 trials. Importantly, even when there were only two items in the
memory set, the mean RT for an N1 trial was 634 ms compared
to 658 and 668 ms on N2 and N3 trials respectively. The same was
true for trials on which there were three items in the memory set:
RTs increased from 661 to 679 to 714 ms. Thus, PI was directly
related to how many times a negative probe had been previously
experienced.
Monsell (1978) used lists of 1, 2, 3 or 4 consonants. On
each trial, the consonants were presented sequentially for 2 s
each. The probe appeared immediately after the final item (no
delay condition) or after 500 ms (delay condition). In the latter
condition, a vowel was presented during the delay period and
subjects were asked to name the vowel. As in other studies, sub-
jects were asked to press one of two buttons to indicate whether
the probe was on the list. For half of the trials, positive probes
were used (i.e., they were in the set) and for the remaining trials,
a negative probe was used (i.e., the probe was not in the set).
There were two types of negative probes: Half of the negative
probes consisted of recent probes. These had appeared as to-
be-remembered stimuli on the previous trial but had not been
presented in the memory set on the current trial. The remaining
half had novel probes, which had not been presented recently.
Subjects were slower and less accurate for recent probes than novel
probes even when the list contained as few as two items. It was
only for the 1-item lists that there was no difference between novel
and recent probes. PI, then, was observed on lists with 2, 3, and
4 items.
McElree and Dosher (1989) also observed PI in short lists
when using negative probes. In Experiment 2, lists of 3, 4, 5, or 6
two-syllable nouns were presented sequentially on the computer
screen. After the presentation of the last word, the probe word
appeared. Response times were slower for both distant and recent
negative probes compared to positive probes. In addition, RTs
were on the order of 50 ms slower for recent negative probes
compared to distant negative proves. Once again, PI was observed
with lists with as few as three items.
Jonides et al. (1998) presented four letters on each trial fol-
lowed by a probe. Recent probes had appeared in the previous
trial, whereas novel probes had not appeared in the two preceding
trials. Subjects gave slower and less accurate responses for recent
negative probes compared to novel probes.
Jonides et al. (2000) conducted a similar study but included
older adults (aged between 61 and 72) in addition to college-aged
subjects. PI due to recent negative probes was again observed,
with the effect even larger for the older compared to younger
subjects.
Atkins et al. (2011) used four words on each trial followed
by a probe. Again, they examined both recent and novel positive
and negative probes. Subjects were slower to correctly respond
to recent negative probes than non-recent negative probes. There
was also a higher false alarm rate for recent negative probes than
non-recent negative probes. Atkins et al. (2011) also included
a condition with concurrent articulation and found even larger
effects of PI than in the quiet condition.
In a second experiment, Atkins et al. (2011) included a manip-
ulation of semantic information. Memory sets were comprised
of items from two semantic categories (fruits and countries) but
still contained four items. In the categorized condition, memory
sets were comprised of words within the same category (e.g., all
fruit words). The category label of the probe item at test either
matched or mismatched the category presented in the memory
set. When it was mismatched, the correct response was a negative
response. There was also a mixed condition, a mixture of fruits
and country words were presented within the memory set which
makes categorization of memory sets difficult. For the mismatch
trials, PI was reduced compared to the match negative trials, but
even so, effects of PI were still observed on the mismatch negative
trials.
Craig et al. (2013) reported 5 experiments. The basic paradigm
was to present four items simultaneously followed by a probe.
One type of probe indicated to subjects that they should respond
whether the probe was one of the four items. Other types of
probes, manipulated over the experiments, indicated to subjects
that they should make a category membership judgment or a
perceptual judgment (i.e., was the probe presented in italics?). In
general, effects of PI were observed on the memory task but not
on the semantic or perceptual judgment task.
There are a number of other studies we could cite, but each has
a characteristic that may make it less clear as an example of PI in
the FOA. For example, Brannelly et al. (1989) used lists of two or
four items, but included a filled delay. PI was observed even for
the 2-item list, but a proponent of the FOA account might argue
that such a delay means that some system other than the FOA was
responsible for the outcome.
As a second example, we briefly mention a related paradigm.
Tehan and colleagues (e.g., Tehan and Humphreys, 1995, 1996;
Tolan and Tehan, 1999; Humphreys and Tehan, 1999; Ralph et al.,
2011) have often used a two list paradigm. On some proportion
of trials, a list of four items is presented and subjects are asked
about that list. It could be via a probe, via serial recall, or via cued
recall. The data of most interest, however, come from the other
trials. Here, the first list is presented, and then a signal is shown
indicating that list is not being tested. A second list is shown,
and subjects are asked about the second list. The items in the
preceding untested list can be designed to cause PI. Using this
procedure, Tehan and colleagues have repeatedly demonstrated
PI when the interfering items in list 1 are relevant given the task
required for list 2. For example, Tehan and Humphreys (1996),
Experiment 2) demonstrated interference by semantic content
with cued recall. The probe question might ask the subject to
recall the item from the immediately preceding list that is a
vegetable and in both the control and interference conditions the
list might contain the word cabbage. The key manipulation is
whether the immediately preceding list contained carrot (same
category) or pumpkin (different category). Responses were less
accurate in the same than different category conditions indicating
PI. Using this type of paradigm, Tehan and colleagues have shown
PI caused by a number of different dimensions. What is most
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important from this series of studies is that PI is not always
observed: It is observed only when the dimension that caused
PI was one that was relevant at test given the type of memory
task.
DISCUSSION
Within the embedded processes model (Cowan, 1999, 2001), the
FOA is viewed as a memory store that is immune to PI. The reason
is because of the representational state of the items: The items
are thought to be present in mind, and “are, in a sense, already
retrieved” and therefore, no retrieval from other memory systems
is needed (Cowan, 2001, p. 103). Within this framework, PI is seen
as occurring during the retrieval process but because retrieval is
not needed for items in the FOA, those items cannot be affected
by PI. Other theorists have proposed similar ideas (e.g., Wickens
et al., 1981; Halford et al., 1988; Schweickert, 1993). When the
number of items in the list is small (usually around 4 or fewer), the
items are said to be represented in a state that allows direct readout
or are in a state in which the items have never left consciousness.
When more items are in the list, then retrieval has to occur, and
then PI can occur. Initial studies using a modified Sternberg task
seemed to support these views: Trials with four or fewer items
showed no effects of PI whereas trials with more than four items
did show PI. However, all of these studies induced PI by semantic
or taxonomic information.
In contrast, there is a larger set of otherwise identical studies in
which PI is observed with four or fewer items. The key difference
is that the majority of these studies did not use semantic or
taxonomic information to induce PI. For example, studies in
which the type of item periodically changes (e.g., from numbers
to letters) show the build-up and release of PI. As another exam-
ple, some studies manipulate whether the probe item has been
seen in previous trials and find that recently seen probes cause
interference. In our view, the key difference between those studies
showing PI and those which do not is whether the potentially
interfering item is relevant given the memory task. In those few
studies where semantic information does cause PI, it is because
the task has been slightly changed to make the semantic dimen-
sion relevant.
If one assumes that memory is primarily a discrimination
task (e.g., Neath and Brown, 2006; Brown et al., 2007), then the
pattern of results is readily explainable. Items can be represented
in memory as points in multidimensional space; which particular
dimensions are relevant depends on the task and how the items
are processed. Similarly, the ability to discriminate between those
items that were on the target list from competitor items also
depends on the relative differences between the items on those
dimensions.
Consider first the study by Hanley and Scheirer (1975). On
the first trial, numbers are shown. The test is easy, because only
4 numbers have been seen so far, despite the fact that numbers
have relatively few relevant dimensions on which they differ
from each other. On the second trial, the test is harder because
the numbers from Trial 1 are now competitors when trying to
remember the numbers from Trial 2. On Trials 3 and 4, even
more competitors are present, leading to more PI. On Trial 5,
however, the stimulus class is changed from numbers to letters, so
the number of competitors is reduced and release from PI is seen.
If one agrees with the idea of cognitive economy—that people
tend to use processes that minimize effort and resources—then
the results from studies like those reported by Halford et al. (1988)
are readily understood without needing to invoke the unique
property of immunity to PI. Instead, one assumes that subjects
use “shallow” processing for short lists because performance is
good enough.2 One consequence is that the dimension that is
supposed to cause interference—taxonomic category—is just not
relevant to this type of processing. It is only when the task
becomes sufficiently hard that the more economical processing
begins to falter that “deeper” processing is performed and now
the taxonomic dimension becomes relevant.
In some studies, the interfering item is made relevant by
reusing items from previous lists as probes for the current list.
“Deep” processing is not necessary here, but interference will
occur because the probe is now a plausible competitor. Finally,
in studies such as Tehan and Humphreys (1995), the taxonomic
dimension is made relevant by changing the question: Recall the
vegetable. Now, interference based on semantic processing occurs,
even though there are as few as four items. It is the task at test that
makes the potentially interfering dimension relevant.
We noted above that our review is limited to those stud-
ies where the number of items is at or below the capacity of
the FOA, and those that use the paradigm most often claimed
to demonstrate immunity. One consequence is that all studies
considered used verbal stimuli. During the review process, one
reviewer noted that the FOA might be immune to PI when non-
verbal stimuli are used in a different paradigm. As an example,
the reviewer cited Lin and Luck (2012), who found no evidence
of PI in a standard change detection task that used simple features
as the stimuli. A review of the visual working memory literature
is beyond the scope of the current article, but we note two
responses.
First, it is important to keep in mind that we fully expect
there to be a large number of paradigms in which PI will not
be observed. Our view does not predict that PI must always be
observed or must be observed in every possible task; rather, it
predicts that PI must be observable in all memory systems. Just as
one can construct a task that taps long-term episodic memory that
does not yield PI, or a task that taps short-term episodic memory
that does not yield PI, or a task that taps implicit memory that
does not yield PI, or a task that taps semantic memory that does
not yield PI, or a task that taps procedural memory that does not
yield PI, one can also construct a task that taps the FOA that does
not yield PI (see Neath and Surprenant, in press, for examples of
PI in all of the aforementioned memory systems). The existence of
such failures to observe PI does not compromise the logic of our
paper: The claim made by a number of researchers (e.g., Wickens
et al., 1981; Halford et al., 1988; Cowan, 1999, 2001; Schweickert,
1993) is that the FOA is immune to PI. A single instance of
demonstrating PI when the items are in the FOA is sufficient to
disprove the claim.
2We use the terms “shallow” and “deep” in a descriptive sense only; we are
not invoking the full theoretical account proposed in the Levels Of Processing
framework (Craik and Lockhart, 1972).
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Second, one of the goals of pursuing the principles agenda is to
identify boundary conditions, and we acknowledge this may very
well be one: With more complex visual (but non-verbal) stimuli,
PI can and does occur, and with other paradigms, PI can and does
occur. With very simple stimuli in one specific task, PI may not
occur. The question then becomes the following: Is this boundary
condition sufficient to invalidate the general principle? Note that
this is a different claim from that which is the focus of this paper.
A claim that certain tasks are immune from PI is quite different
from one claiming a particular memory system (or subsystem) is
immune to PI, and it is also a claim that is entirely compatible
with the principles approach.
CONCLUSIONS
There are no accounts of PI that require PI be always observed
at all times in all tests of a particular memory system. Rather,
the various accounts of PI predict that PI will be observed when,
for example, a retrieval cue becomes overloaded (Watkins and
Watkins, 1981) or an item becomes relatively less distinct than
competitors (Baddeley, 1976; Brown et al., 2007). Consistent
with these and other accounts of PI, our review of the relevant
literature found some studies that found evidence of PI when
items were presumably held in the FOA and some studies that
did not find evidence of PI. This pattern of results is, we claim,
the same as is observed for other memory systems. For example,
there are a large number of studies that fail to find PI in long-term
memory tasks. In the long-term memory literature, there are no
researchers who posit that long-term memory is immune to PI
on the basis of those studies that did not observe PI. Rather, it
is simply a reflection of the fact that although a memory system
might be susceptible to PI, it need not show PI in every single
study.
In this respect, the FOA is just like every other memory system:
It is susceptible to PI under the appropriate conditions. There are
presumably many tasks in which items are thought to be in the
FOA that do not show evidence of PI. But there are a sufficiently
large number of studies that do demonstrate PI when then items
are in the FOA. Thus, the claim that items in the FOA are immune
to PI is disproven. Whether PI occurs depends on how the items
are represented and on how the items are processed. If an item
could potentially interfere with a target but the dimension that
could lead to interference is not relevant to the task, then PI
will not be observed. In contrast, if an item could potentially
interfere with a target and the task is such that the dimension
that could lead to interference is now relevant to the task, then
PI will be observed. This applies whether the item is thought to be
in implicit memory, procedural memory, episodic memory, long-
term memory, short-term memory, working memory, or, as we
have argued here, the FOA.
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